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1  Introduction 
 
The central hypothesis of this paper is that the extent of wage mobility in a given 
economic sector is related to the degree of concentration and regulation in that sector: 
the greater the extent of concentration the lower will be the expected level of wage 
mobility. The relationship between the degree of concentration and labor market 
regulation on the one hand, and wage mobility on the other, has been examined in 
earlier studies (a recent example is provided in Cardoso, 2006) but these studies have 
taken the form of international comparisons of differing types of economies as a whole 
rather than being located at the sectoral level within a given country. This macro-level 
analysis may be regarded as problematic because it is influenced by numerous macro-
economic variables (such as economic growth, unemployment level and inflation) 
which may affect mobility patterns. As far as is known, the research reported here is 
the first of its kind, in analyzing the relationship between wages mobility and the 
degree of concentration and regulation at the sectoral level. 
 
Using a unique eight-year combined data set (matching Israeli Census data with 
detailed wages information from the National Insurance Institute), the paper examines 
patterns of wage mobility in Israel in two differing types of sectors: those that exhibit a 
high level of concentration and significant regulation and those that are more diffuse 
and unregulated. Also, this association should be evident in sub-sectors, within both the 
public and the private sectors: more concentrated and regulated sectors are expected to 
be associated with lower wages mobility.  
 
 
2        Background  
It has been argued in the literature that more centralized labor markets with stricter 
regulations should exhibit lower wage mobility (e.g., Gottschalk 1997). This lower 
wage mobility would be explained partly by more continuous work histories and a 
lower tendency to change working places. Empirical evidence is scarce. The findings 
of international comparisons of labour markets, between countries, have not supported 
this view.  Burkhauser et al. (1997) find similar mobility levels in the U.S. and    3
Germany. Aaberge et. Al. (2002) report lower mobility in the U.S. compared with the 
Scandinavian countries. The OECD (1997) found similar mobility levels in the U.S. 
and the U.K. and Cardoso (2006) concludes that the contrasting labour markets in the 
U.K. and in Portugal are not significantly different in terms of wage mobility. 
A potential methodological and statistical problem that underlies these comparative 
studies is that the countries that have been examined and compared are very different in 
many macro economic aspects (business cycles, unemployment, growth, inflation and 
more). These factors, which might well affect wage mobility, have not been considered 
or controlled for. Unless we control for these differences, it cannot be concluded that 
stricter regulation does not lead to lower wage mobility.   
The present study overcomes this potential problem which might bias the results, by 
examining different sectors within the same economy over a given time interval. Since 
all macro effects are held constant, sector-specific institutional effects are responsible 
for differences in the degree of wage mobility between economic sectors.  
 
While the wide international empirical literature on wage mobility has focused on 
measuring wage mobility for whole economies and comparisons between countries, 
the pioneering study of wages mobility in Israel by Romanov and Zussman (2003) 
did include a sectoral dimension, though this was not its main focus. Using income-
tax administrative data for 1993-1996, they examined the differing patterns of wage 
mobility in a number of directions over this three-year period, including a 
comparison of wage mobility in the public and private sectors. However, the 
research did not examine the effect of concentration and regulation on sectoral 
wage mobility.  
 
Unusually, Romanov and Zussman reported greater wage mobility in the public 
sector than in the private sector; this contrasts with the generally accepted 
assumption of greater wage stability in the public sector (for example, this is 
confirmed for Austrian data in Raferzeder and Winter-Ebmer, 2006). However, 
there may be a compositional issue here. This is because both the private and the 
public sector are internally diverse, with each containing contrasting sub-sectors in 
terms of concentration and regulation. Thus wage mobility will be influenced not 
only by the public-private sector divide but also by the degree of sub-sectoral   4
concentration within both the private and the public sectors.  In this paper we 
confirm, with Israeli data, that wage mobility is greater in the private than in the 
public sector. But when these two sectors are broken down into concentrated and 
non-concentrated groupings, we observe that for both the public and private sectors, 
wage mobility in the low concentrated sub-sector grouping substantially exceeds 
wage mobility in the highly concentrated sub-sector grouping. The level of 





3   Research objectives 
 
The aim of the research reported in this paper is to measure and compare patterns of 
wage mobility for four different sectoral groupings, based on the extent of 
concentration.  The common finding that private sector wage mobility exceeds wage 
mobility in the public sector is tempered by our working assumption that workers 
employed in sectors with greater concentration (whether private or public) will 
experience less wage mobility than those in low concentrated sectors. The private 
sector low-concentrated sectors include such sub-sectors as computer services and hi-
tech; the public low concentrated sector includes public administration. Sectors of high 
concentration are typified by commercial banking (private) and public monopolies such 
as water and electricity.  
 
Thus, wages mobility is expected to display the following pattern: 
Private sector > public sector 
Private sector, low concentration > private sector, high concentration 
Public sector, low concentration > public sector, high concentration 
Low concentrated public & private sectors > high concentrated public & private sectors  
 
4        Data base 
The study is based on a newly compiled, combined database, which provides 
information on individual labor market histories over a thirteen-year period. Individual   5
background information from the 1995 Population Census is matched with data on 
individual work histories from the National Insurance Institute (NII) administrative 
records; this forms an extensive database covering some 20% of the Israeli population 
(Neuman and Ziderman, 2003).
1 
The NII compiles information on individuals’ annual wages from all employers and on 
employment start and finish dates for each period of continuous work. The NII data 
were linked to data on personal characteristics for a sample of individuals from the 
1995 Census. The Census of Population is the most comprehensive source of 
demographic and socio-economic data on the Israeli population. The extended 
questionnaire, filled out by 20 percent of the population, provides information, for all 
individuals aged 15 and over, a series of socio-economic variables, including gender, 
sector of employment and monthly wage. Data from the 20 percent sample were 
matched with individual work profiles and wages data from the NII, for a period of 
thirteen years. This new joint data source constitutes a unique longitudinal data set on 
wages and work histories of a large representative sample of the Israeli population of 
working age, during the years 1983-1995. 
Our data set may be seen as an improvement on that used by Romanov and Zussman in 
their study of labor income mobility for Israel in 1993-96: it covers many more years 
and uses non-truncated earnings data (see below). More important, our study employs 
finer sectoral breakdowns. 
While the data set contains data for the time period of 1983-1995, the analysis of wage 
mobility is restricted to the years 1988-1995. Income data for 1983-1987 is problematic 
and not compatible with the 1988-1995 period data, for a number of reasons:  
    The change in 1987 of the beginning of the calendar year: it was April up to 
1987 and then it changed to January subsequently; 
  A national minimum wage was introduced in 1987; 
  During the first half of the 1980s, inflation in the Israeli economy rose to 
unprecedented records, with a peak of over 400% in 1984. The stabilization 
program, introduced in 1985, brought inflation down dramatically to 19.7% 
in 1986 and to less than 20% in each of the years of our study.   6
Hyperinflation has macro economic effects on wage structures that are 
difficult to control for. The time period used in the analysis (1988-1995) is 
much more homogenous with relatively reasonable inflation rates. 
The analysis uses annual wages information from the NII Administrative Records, 
rather than wages data from the Census. In general, administrative tax data are more 
reliable than those reported by individuals in surveys; the use of direct administrative 
data collection in this study ensures that measurement errors are minor. Administrative 
income tax records are sometimes censored, both at the bottom (individuals who are 
below the minimum contribution level and do not pay taxes are not registered) and at 
the top (due to contribution ceilings or confidentiality measures). Obviously, the use of 
such truncated samples compromises the validity of empirical studies of inequality and 
mobility. The data set used in our study contains wages for all employees, including 
workers at the bottom and at the top of the wage distribution. Problems associated with 
truncated samples are thus avoided.  
 
The NII records include information on annual wages (which is deflated and 
expressed in 1995 prices). Information on number of hours of work is not available. 
To overcome this problem, the empirical wage analysis is restricted to a 
homogenous sample of full-year, full-time workers (in 1995) who had a continuous 
attachment to the labor market over the time period under discussion. Work history 
information (Neuman and Ziderman, 2003) facilitated the identification of 
respondents with a stable, continuous link to the labor market. To justify the use of 
annual wage earnings (not controlling for hours) we also make the assumption that 
workers employed full time in 1995 (when we have detailed personal data) had the 
same work load also in 1988-1994. This is most probably the case for male 
workers. Because we are less confident that this assumption holds for women, they 
are not included in the analysis.  
 
Workers may have switched sectors during the period under scrutiny. Since 
mobility between economic sectors represents an alternative channel for wage 
mobility, the analysis includes only those workers who have worked continuously 
over the eight-year period 1988-1995, without even one short work break.  It is rare 
for a worker to move to another sector without a break in employment, so that the   7
effect of including only continuously employed workers is to wean out of the data 
set workers who have been mobile between economic sectors over the period.  
 
The analysis is restricted to Jewish individuals between the ages of 32-65 in 1995. The 
lower age limit is chosen in order to exclude respondents who were under the age of 25 
in 1988 and may have been serving in the armed forces. The upper limit is set to 
include only individuals who have not reached formal retirement age (65 for men, at 
that time). Immigrants who arrived after 1983 are excluded from the sample, to ensure 
that all immigrants included in the study had at least five years to learn the language 
and to adjust to the Israeli labor market. 
 
The remaining sample of 25,713 individuals was assigned to employment in either the 
public or private sector, based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). After 
dropping individuals employed in mixed (private-public) SIC industrial categories, the 
remaining sample of 22,298 males was distributed as follows: 6,341 in the public sector 
and 15,957 in the private sector. 
  
SIC industries were assigned to one of four sectoral groupings (Private sector, low 
concentration; Private sector, high concentration; Public sector, low concentration; 
and Public sector, high concentration), based on the extent of concentration in that 
sector in 1995. The concentration ratio (CR3) refers to the share in total sectoral 
sales of the three largest concerns in the sector. Sectors with concentration ratios of 
less than 25% were defined as of low concentration, while those sectors with 
concentration ratios in excess of 50% were designated as highly concentrated 
sectors.
2 Sectors with concentration ratios in the 25-50% range, and those sectors 
that could not be specified, were excluded from the analysis (11,184 workers). 
 
The final sample, on which the analysis is based, totaled 11,114. These are distributed 
amongst the four sectoral groupings, as follows: 
Private sector, low concentration    4,836 
Private sector, high concentration   2,038 
Public sector, low concentration     2,963 
Public sector, high concentration    1,277   8




5 Wage  mobility  measures 
 
Two measures are employed to measure relative wage mobility, in terms of changes in 
the position of the workers in the wage distribution over the defined period:        
  Mobility matrix (wage quintiles) 
  The first measure provides a broad indication of such wages movement, 
reporting the percentage of workers that switched their rank in the wage distribution 
between the initial and final periods. Partitioning the worker sample into wage quintiles 
in the two years 1988 and 1995, the wage mobility matrix shows movement of workers 
between wage quintile categories over the seven year period. The more workers that 
change rank in the wage distribution (i.e. move to a different quintile), the greater is the 
extent of wage mobility. Workers who remain in the same quintile in both years (i.e. lie 
on the matrix diagonal) display no wage mobility. Wage mobility (off the diagonal) 
may be upward (moving to a higher wage quintile) or downward (moving to a lower 




  Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient (S) 
 
  This is the well-known non-parametric measure of correlation equivalent to the 
Pearson correlation coefficient but computed on rank position rather than levels of a 
variable.



















Rank it and rank is are percentile ranks of worker i in the wage distribution in time 
period t and s, respectively. N is the total number of workers in the sample. S is a   9
no wage immobility, i.e.  (   zero ranges between    mobility and im measure of wage 
maximal wage mobility) and unity (maximum wage immobility, i.e. no wage 
mobility). We compute alternative measures of S for t and s that are one and four 




6   Findings 
 
Wage mobility in the public and private sectors, overall  
 
We first examine wage mobility in the public and private sectors as a whole. Mobility 
matrices for wage quintiles are shown in Table 1. More detailed, wage decile, matrices 
are shown in Appendix Table 2. Both sets of matrices confirm that wage mobility in 
the private sector exceeds wage mobility in the public sector. 
The figures shown on the diagonals (in bold) represent the percentages of workers who 
are in the same wages quintile in the initial and final year. These diagonal values are 
consistently higher in the public sector matrix than in the private sector matrix, 
reflecting greater wage immobility in the public sector (greater wages mobility in the 
private sector). For example, 49.76 percent of public sector workers in the second wage 
quintile in 1988, remained in that quintile eight years later, compared with 43.21 
percent of workers in the private sector.  
Table 1 relates to wage mobility over seven years. The Spearman Rank Correlation 
Coefficient (S) provides a more compact, synthetic measure of wage mobility. In Figure 
1 we plot S coefficients for successive one and four year periods, for both the private 
and public sectors. Since S provides a measure of wage immobility, the lower is the 
curve, the higher is the level of wage mobility. The curves in the upper section of 
Figure 1, relating to successive one-year mobility periods, intertwine - indicating little 
difference in measured wage mobility between the two sectors. However, as the time 
interval over which S is measured is increased, wage mobility is seen to be greater.
4 For 
four-year time periods shown in the lower part of the figure wage mobility shown to be 
very much higher in both sectors; S ranges from 0.92 to 0.96 for one-year wage   10
mobility and from 0.84 to 0.89 for four-year wage mobility.
5 More important, private 
sector wage mobility is substantially in excess of wage mobility in the public sector, 




Wage mobility matrices 
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Private Sector 
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Figure 1   
Earnings (im)mobility (Spearman rank correlation coefficient),   
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*  The x-axis indicates the end year.  
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Wage mobility: the role of sectoral concentration 
  
Both the public and private are internally diverse; in each case, parts of the sector is 
highly concentrated while other parts display low concentration. How does 
concentration affect wages mobility in these sub-sectors?  
 
Wage mobility matrices for 1988-1995, based on decile transitions, are computed 
for each of the four sub-sectors: Private sector, low concentration; Private sector, 
high concentration; Public sector, low concentration and Public sector, high 
concentration. Detailed transition wage matrices are given in Appendix Table 3; the 
results are summarized in Table 2. For ease of comparison, only the diagonal cells 
of the decile matrices (representing wages immobility) are presented in the table; 
the lower are the values of these cells, the greater is wage mobility.  
 
The importance of partitioning the public and private sectors by extent of 
concentration is apparent from the Table 2 results. For both the private and public 
sector groupings, wage mobility in the low concentration sub-sector exceeds that in 
the high concentration sub-sector. This result is consistent for virtually all decile 
pairs, both public and private (the one exception is the fifth decile in the public 
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Table 2 
Wage mobility matrices for public and private sector groupings, diagonal cells 




workers in each 
decile remaining 




Private  Public 
(1)            (2)           (3)         (4) 










st decile  52.7 
 
  61.3 
53.5       65.6 
2
nd decile  31.4  37.3  26.4       37.5 
3
rd decile  22.4  28.4  25.7       29.7 
4
th decile  21.1  24.0  22.6       25.3 
5
th decile  16.6  22.7  25.7       18.0 
6
th decile  16.5  23.9  25.0       29.7 
7
th decile  19.6  28.1  23.9       24.4 
8
th decile  24.2  29.9  30.1       37.5 
9
th decile  33.5  40.2  37.8       48.4 
10
th decile  54.7  67.0  58.5       73.2 
   15
 
The table also shows that the finding of higher wage mobility in the private than the 
public sector, noted in the previous section, is generally preserved even after 
partitioning on the basis of concentration. For low concentration sectors, the value 
in Column (3) exceeds that in Column (1) for each decile (except for the second 
decile). Similar results are found for highly concentrated sectors, shown in Columns 
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Figure 2 
Earnings (im)mobility (Spearman rank correlation coefficient), by sector: 
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* The x-axis indicates the end year.    17
 
These findings are generally consistent with the Spearman rank correlation 
coefficients, for the four sub-sector groupings, that are plotted in Figure 2.   
 
The upper panel relates to one-year wage mobility. Low-concentrated private and 
public sub-sectors each display greater earnings mobility than their high-
concentration counterpart sub-sectors; this confirms our finding that the level of 
sub-sectoral concentration plays a central explanatory role in accounting for 
between sectoral differences in wage mobility. However, little difference is 
displayed in wage mobility between either of the two low concentration or the high 
concentration sub-sectors.   
 
S curves for four-year periods are plotted in the lower panel of Figure 2. Again, for 
both the private and the public sectoral divisions, wage mobility is greater in the 
low-concentration sub-sector than in the high- concentration sector. While high 
concentration public and private sub-sector curves still coincide (as for the one-year 
curves), clear differences in the low concentration curves now emerge; wage 
mobility in the low concentrated private sector grouping is significantly greater than 
wage mobility in the low concentration public sector. Overall, the effect of sectoral 
concentration dominates over the public/private sectoral division, in accounting for 




    18
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Appendix Table 1 
Sectoral groupings,  








(sample size = 2963) 
 
Public: monopolistic 









77 Public  administration 400  Electricity 
 
410,  610  Water 
603 Railways   
650  National port and national courier 
activities 
 
Private: low concentrated  
(sample size = 4836) 
 
Private: high concentrated  









 17  Textiles   13  Other mining and quarrying 
 18  Outwear (not knitted)   16  Beverages & tobacco 
 19  Footwear, leather 
210  Basic manufacture of paper and 
cardboard  202 Builders’  carpentry 
222 Printing  221  Publishing  periodicals 
223  Publishing recorded media  243  Pesticides and disinfectants 
246  Soap, detergents  353  Building of ships and boats 
248  Chemical products n.e.c.  355  Manufacture of aircraft 
25  Plastic and rubber products 
358  Manufacture of other transport 
equipment  260-262 Glass,  ceramics 
28  Metal products  670  Commercial banks 
29  Machinery and equipment 
 
30   Office machinery and computers 
31 Electric  motors 
32 Electronical  components 
350-351  Motor vehicles, bodies and parts 
36 Furniture 
38  Jewelry, gold and silver articles 
390-395 Manufacturing  n.e.c. 
450-458 Building 
501-502  Motor vehicles sales and repair 
550 Hotels 
550-563, 
568  Restaurants, dining services 
633  Travel and tourist agencies 
720-723 Computers 
760-761, 
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Appendix Table 2 
Mobility matrices, decile transition 
Private and public sectors, 1988-1995 
 
Private  
            
To decile  
                     
From 
decile 1234567891 0
1 55.35 20.10 9.02 4.51 3.07 2.13 1.82 1.44 1.25 1.31
2 22.51 32.85 19.87 11.29 5.96 3.01 1.69 1.25 0.88 0.69
3 9.21 23.43 22.56 19.24 10.59 7.27 3.20 2.51 1.19 0.81
4 4.38 11.71 21.10 21.73 16.78 11.21 6.32 3.57 2.00 1.19
5 2.38 4.89 13.43 20.70 20.51 16.06 11.54 6.21 2.76 1.51
6 1.82 2.76 6.64 11.65 19.80 20.11 16.60 11.78 6.27 2.57
7 1.57 1.94 2.76 5.39 13.85 18.86 21.93 16.98 12.03 4.70
8 0.82 1.32 2.19 3.07 5.45 14.98 20.25 24.45 19.56 7.90
9 0.63 0.44 1.07 1.50 2.13 4.70 13.53 24.56 31.89 19.55
10 1.32 0.56 1.38 0.88 1.88 1.69 3.13 7.21 22.19 59.75
 
Public  
            
To decile  
                     
From 
decile 1234567891 0
1 59.37 17.48 8.19 4.25 2.99 2.36 1.10 0.94 1.57 1.73
2 23.82 34.86 17.51 10.41 6.15 3.94 1.10 0.79 1.10 0.32
3 5.67 25.35 29.61 17.80 10.55 6.77 2.52 0.63 0.63 0.47
4 3.16 12.32 25.12 27.01 16.59 9.64 3.48 1.58 0.95 0.16
5 2.52 4.10 11.20 23.19 24.13 14.35 11.04 5.68 3.00 0.79
6 1.10 1.74 4.26 10.73 19.24 23.66 19.87 11.67 5.52 2.21
7 1.42 1.42 1.74 3.31 11.04 23.19 25.24 17.98 8.99 5.68
8 0.95 1.10 0.63 1.26 5.84 9.94 23.66 24.61 20.82 11.2
9 1.26 0.95 0.16 0.79 1.58 3.47 8.04 28.39 36.44 18.93
10 0.79 0.63 1.58 1.26 1.89 2.68 3.94 7.73 20.98 58.52
    21
Appendix Table 3 
Mobility matrices, decile transition 
Private low and high concentration, and public low and high concentration, 
 1988-1995 
   22
Private low concentration  
 
            
To decile  
                    
From 
decile 1 234567891 0
1 52.69 21.49 8.06 5.17 3.31 2.69 2.07 1.86 1.65 1.03
2 21.49 31.40 18.80 11.36 7.02 4.55 2.27 1.45 0.83 0.83
3 8.07 22.15 22.36 16.15 13.46 7.87 4.35 2.90 2.07 0.62
4 5.99 11.16 21.90 21.07 16.12 10.74 6.61 4.13 1.86 0.41
5 4.55 6.83 12.63 17.81 16.56 19.46 11.18 6.83 2.48 1.66
6 1.65 3.51 6.20 13.43 19.42 16.53 18.80 10.95 6.61 2.89
7 1.86 2.27 3.93 7.85 11.98 18.18 19.63 20.25 9.09 4.96
8 1.45 0.83 3.11 2.69 6.83 12.22 19.25 24.22 18.43 10.97
9 1.03 0.21 1.65 2.27 3.51 4.75 11.16 20.04 33.47 21.90
10 1.24 0.21 1.24 2.28 1.66 3.11 4.76 7.25 23.60 54.66
  
 
Private high concentration  
 
            
To decile  
                      
From 
decile1234567891 0
1 61.27 20.10 8.82 3.92 2.45 0.98 1.96 0 0.49 0
2 17.65 37.25 18.14 13.24 6.86 2.94 2.94 0.49 0.49 0
3 10.78 21.08 28.43 16.18 10.78 8.33 3.43 0.49 0.49 0
4 1.47 16.18 22.55 24.02 15.69 12.25 3.92 2.94 0.98 0
5 2.46 2.96 14.78 25.12 22.66 16.75 7.39 5.42 2.46 0
6 1.46 0.49 4.88 10.73 22.93 23.90 19.51 10.73 3.41 1.95
7 1.97 0.49 1.48 5.42 12.81 21.18 28.08 21.18 5.91 1.48
8 0 0.98 0 1.47 4.41 11.76 24.51 29.90 21.08 5.88
9 1.47 0 0.49 0 0.98 1.96 7.35 24.02 40.20 23.53










Public low concentration   
 
            
To decile  
                        
From 
decile 1234567891 0
1 53.54 23.91 6.06 5.39 3.03 3.37 1.68 1.35 0.67 1.01  23
2 24.66 26.35 24.66 8.45 8.78 3.38 2.36 0.68 0.34 0.34
3 7.43 26.01 25.68 17.91 10.81 6.08 3.72 1.69 0 0.68
4 3.37 11.45 19.19 22.56 17.17 13.13 9.43 2.36 1.35 0
5 3.72 6.42 14.19 22.30 25.68 14.53 7.77 2.70 2.36 0.34
6 1.69 2.70 6.08 12.84 17.23 25.00 15.88 8.78 6.76 3.04
7 1.68 1.01 2.69 6.73 9.76 19.87 23.91 19.53 11.11 3.70
8 1.01 0.34 0.68 1.01 4.39 9.46 23.31 30.07 19.26 10.47
9 1.35 0.34 0 1.01 1.35 2.03 7.09 27.03 37.84 21.96
10 1.69 1.35 0.68 2.03 1.69 3.04 5.07 5.74 20.27 58.45
  
 
Public high concentration  
 
            
To decile  
                        
From 
decile1234567891 0
1 65.63 21.88 5.47 3.13 0.78 0.78 0 0.78 1.56 0
2 25.00 37.50 17.97 12.50 3.13 1.56 0.78 1.56 0 0
3 6.25 30.47 29.69 16.41 9.38 5.47 1.56 0 0 0.78
4 0 6.30 24.41 25.20 29.13 7.87 5.51 1.57 0 0
5 1.56 3.13 14.06 24.22 17.97 25.00 9.38 3.13 0.78 0.78
6 0.78 0 5.47 13.28 17.97 29.69 18.75 7.81 4.69 1.56
7 0 0 3.15 3.15 14.96 13.39 24.41 23.62 14.96 2.36
8 0 0 0 1.56 3.91 10.16 25.78 37.50 13.28 7.81
9 0.78 0 0 0 1.56 3.91 10.94 21.09 48.44 13.28
10 0 0.79 0 0 1.57 2.36 2.36 3.15 16.54 73.23
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1  Buchinsky et al., (2003) claim that “for no other country in the world is such information 
(administrative records) available for a nationally-representative sample of the working population” 
(page 2). Clearly, they were unaware that such a data set has been available in Israel since 2002. 
  
2  The assignment of sectors into low and high concentration was based on the various sources. For 
the private sector, information on CR3 in Manufacturing was provided by the Israel Antitrust 
Authority; the identification of CR3 for the Banking sector is based on data provided by the Bank of 
Israel; our general knowledge was used for such sectors as Restaurants, Hotels, Motor Vehicles 
Sales and Repair, which are composed of many small enterprises. For the public sector, Public 
Administration, spread through numerous government offices and service centres, is defined as low 
concentrated; public monopolies that are country-wide, are highly concentrated. Sectors that are 
ambiguous with regard to level of concentration were excluded from the low-high concentration 
comparison.    
    
3  For an explanation of Spearman’s rho, see Conover (1999), p. 314-315 
 
4     A number of studies have been restricted to one-year wage mobility measures, usually because of 
(longitudinal) data limitations; the use of such short time horizons are unlikely to produce reliable 
findings. Two and three year wage mobility graphs are available from the authors 
    
5  Clearly, S curves relating to two and three year time periods lie between the curves plotted in 
Figure 1.  
      Electronic versions of the papers are available at 
http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/ec/wp/working_papers.html 
Bar-Ilan University 
Department of Economics 
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